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JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal by 
virtue of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) in 
that the appeal is taken from an order of the Third Judicial 
District Court for Salt Lake County over which the Utah Court 
of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. The 
Defendant/Appellant is entitled to this appeal as a matter of 
right by virtue* of the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-31a-19(l). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
This appeal presents a single issue: was the district 
court correct in ruling that Appellant Blue Cross Blue Shield 
of Utah ("BCBSU") waived its right to compel arbitration of the 
claims asserted against it by the plaintiffs/appellees? This 
issue is subject to review under the "correction of error" 
standard because the trial court's decision was based solely on 
the pleadings filed in the case and involved no assessment of 
witness credibility; In re Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916 (Utah 
App. 1988). The pivotal question in this case is a question of 
law warranting the "correction of error" standard of review; 
T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 906 (Utah App. 1988). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Section 4(1) of the Utah Arbitration Act, Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-31a-4(l), gives the appellant the right to compel 
arbitration in this case: 
(1) The court, upon motion of any party-
showing the existence of an arbitration 
agreement, shall order the parties to 
arbitrate. If an issue is raised concerning 
the existence of an arbitration agreement or 
the scope of the matters covered by the 
agreement, the court shall determine those 
issues and order or deny arbitration 
accordingly. 
The Federal Arbitration Act provides in 9 U.S.C. § 2 
and 3, as follows: 
Validity, irrevocability, and 
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate 
A written provision in any maritime 
transaction or a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by 
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising 
out of such contract or transaction, or the 
refusal to perform the whole or any part 
thereof, or an agreement in writing to 
submit to arbitration an existing 
controversy arising out of such a contract, 
transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract. 
Stay of proceedings where issue therein 
referable to arbitration 
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If any suit or proceeding be brought in 
any of the courts of the United States upon 
any issue referable to arbitration under an 
agreement in writing for such arbitration, 
the court in which such suit is pending, 
upon being satisfied that the issue involved 
in such suit or proceeding is referable to 
arbitration under such an agreement, shall 
on application of one of the parties stay 
the trial of the action until such 
arbitration has been had in accordance with 
the terms of the agreement, providing the 
applicant for the stay is not in default in 
proceeding with such arbitration. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal of right from an order of the 
district court denying the motion of defendant/appellant BCBSU 
to compel arbitration of the claims asserted against it by the 
plaintiffs/appellees ("plaintiffsM). This action was brought 
by the plaintiffs in November, 1987 against Massachusetts 
Mutual Life Insurance Company ("Massachusetts Mutual"), two 
Massachusetts Mutual agents, Gary D. Henderson and Steven G. 
Sholy, and the Utah Dental Association ("the UDA"). In 
November, 1988 plaintiffs served BCBSU with an amended 
complaint naming it as a defendant. In April, 1989, BCBSU 
filed a motion to compel arbitration of the claims asserted 
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against it. The matter was heard by the Honorable Timothy R. 
Hanson, August 28, 1989. The court issued a memorandum 
decision denying the motion to compel arbitration November 14, 
1989 on the ground that BCBSU had waived its right to 
arbitration and entered an order denying the motion December 
21, 1989.1/ 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This action was filed November 30, 1987 by seven 
of the current plaintiffs against Massachusetts Mutual, 
Henderson & Sholy, a Utah partnership, Gary D. Henderson, 
Steven G. Sholy and the UDA. The original complaint includes 
the following factual allegations which form the background of 
this dispute: (The Complaint is found at R2-30.) 
a. The plaintiffs are dentists and members of 
the Utah Dental Association. (Complaint If 7). 
b. In 1975, the UDA entered into an agreement 
with BCBSU whereby UDA agreed to endorse a BCBSU 
health insurance plan and encourage its members to 
obtain that insurance, in return for which BCBSU 
agreed to provide health insurance benefits to all 
1/ A separate motion of defendant Massachusetts Mutual to 
dismiss the action on the grounds that it was preempted by the 
federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act, was submitted 
and ruled upon by the court in the same decision. That motion 
was denied as well but is unrelated to this appeal. 
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existing dues paying members of the UDA and their 
families, regardless of pre-existing illnesses and 
disabilities. (Complaint, If 11, 12) 
C. During 1985 and 1986, the UDA invited agents 
from other insurance companies to propose alternative 
health insurance plans to the UDA to replace the BCBSU 
plan. (Complaint § 20) 
d. In the spring of 1987, the UDA terminated 
the BCBSU plan. (Complaint, If 18). 
e. Defendants Henderson and Sholy, acting as 
agents of Massachusetts Mutual, repeatedly urged the 
UDA to terminate the BCBSU plan and assured the UDA 
that no one would lose insurance coverage as a result 
of the change in plans. (Complaint, 1Mf 22 and 23). 
f. By letter of July 1, 1987 the UDA informed 
its members that it had withdrawn its endorsement of 
the BCBSU plan and changed its endorsement to the 
Massachusetts Mutual plan. No mention was made that 
plaintiffs would be ineligible for Massachusetts 
Mutual Insurance. (Complaint, If 25). 
f. Because the UDA terminated its endorsement 
of the BCBSU plan and encouraged all members to obtain 
health insurance through Massachusetts Mutual, BCBSU 
-5-
notified all UDA members by letter of July 12, 1987 
that their insurance under the BCBSU plan would 
terminate November 1, 1987. Blue Cross' notice that 
benefits would be stopped was lawful, (Complaint, 
1f 26). 
g. The Massachusetts Mutual plan did not 
automatically provide insurance for all members of the 
UDA and their families. Instead, Massachusetts Mutual 
reserved the right to deny participation in the plan 
to UDA members or family members who suffered from a 
pre-existing disability or other excluded illness. As 
a result, the plaintiffs' applications for health 
insurance from Massachusetts Mutual were rejected. 
(Complaint, 1f 27) . 
h. Plaintiffs were unable to obtain coverage 
from any other insurance carrier which was comparable 
in price and terms to the terminated BCBSU plan. 
(Complaint If 29) 
i. Plaintiffs alleged causes of action against 
the UDA for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence in 
terminating the BCBSU plan and endorsing a 
Massachusetts Mutual plan as well as claims for breach 
of contract and violation of bylaws; claims for 
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misrepresentation, negligence and interference with 
economic relations were alleged against Massachusetts 
Mutual and the individual agents. (Complaint MM 32-82) 
2. The defendants answered plaintiffs' complaint and 
the parties proceeded with active litigation, including 
numerous interrogatories and document requests as well as 
depositions. (R. 31-188) 
3. In May, 1988 plaintiffs moved for leave to file 
an amended complaint adding three individuals as plaintiffs who 
claimed to have sustained the same injury alleged by the 
original plaintiffs and an amended complaint was filed. 
(R. 139-166) 
4. By notice of July 13, 1988 plaintiffs scheduled 
numerous depositions to occur in August and September, 1988 as 
well as the three depositions of Massachusetts Mutual employees 
at the company's headquarters in Springfield, Massachusetts to 
occur October 5 through 7, 1988. (R. 167-169) 
5. On October 4, 1988 plaintiffs moved for leave to 
file a second amended complaint adding BCBSU as a defendant. 
The complaint was not served upon BCBSU until November 2, 
1988. In their second amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged 
for the first time that the termination by BCBSU of its 
contracts with UDA members was a breach of those contracts and 
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claims were asserted against BCBSU for breach of contract, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and for punitive 
damages. (R. 191-241) 
6, BCBSU filed its answer, denying any liability to 
the plaintiffs, and its cross-claims for contribution against 
codefendants on November 22, 1988. (R. 252-283) 
7• The BCBSU contracts with UDA members each contain 
the following provision which made it lawful for BCBSU to 
terminate the contracts of all UDA members, without regard to 
their health, on account of the withdrawal of the UDA 
endorsement: 
The plans shall have the right to 
terminate this agreement and all coverage 
hereunder with respect to any member by 
giving thirty (30) days prior written notice 
thereof to the Subscriber or to the 
Subscriber's Group Leader; provided, 
however, that this Agreement shall not be 
terminated by reason of any Member's health. 
(Depo. Exhibit 46, R. 636) 
8. Plaintiffs promptly served lengthy discovery 
requests upon BCBSU including interrogatories and two sets of 
requests for production of documents. (R. 312-315, 359-361) 
9. The depositions of Massachusetts Mutual employees 
were rescheduled and occurred December 22 through 24, 1988, in 
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Springfield, Massachusetts. The depositions were taken by the 
plaintiffs with representatives of all parties in attendance, 
(R. 455) 
10. Immediately thereafter, plaintiffs noticed the 
deposition of a BCBSU employee pursuant to Rule 36b(6) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 319) 
11. BCBSU responded to plaintiffs' discovery requests 
and produced voluminous documents to the plaintiffs. (R. 330) 
12. Plaintiffs continued to submit discovery requests 
to other parties in January, February, 1989 to which responses 
were received in March, 1989. (R. 356-358; 364-370) 
13. In February, 1989, plaintiffs moved for a 
scheduling and management conference. (R. 344) By minute 
entry of April 18, 1989, the district court denied plaintiffs' 
motion for a scheduling conference noting that no notice of 
readiness for trial had been given and the record did not 
reflect that the parties were ready for trial. (R. 458-459) 
14. In March, 1989 BCBSU served interrogatories and 
requests for production of documents on the plaintiffs. By 
stipulation, however, plaintiffs were relieved of any 
obligation to respond prior to the date when they became due 
and no responses to those discovery requests were ever made. 
(R. 368) 
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15. BCBSU circulated a stipulation for a protective 
order whereby BCBSU would have received the same protection for 
its confidential documents as the parties had agreed to provide 
to each other prior to the joinder of BCBSU. However, no 
stipulation or motion for protective order was ever filed by 
BCBSU. 
16. BCBSU filed its motion to compel arbitration and 
to stay proceedings April 7, 1989. 
17. A hearing was held on the motion to compel 
arbitration August 28, 1989. At that hearing counsel for BCBSU 
explained to the court that, due to the timing of the amendment 
to the BCBSU contracts which included the compulsory 
arbitration provision, BCBSU was not certain at first whether 
an arbitration provision was included in plaintiffs1 health 
care agreements. Counsel was required to review voluminous 
documents and previously conducted discovery to become familiar 
with the case, and was pressured by the plaintiffs to attend 
out of state depositions and to respond to extensive discovery 
requests immediately thereafter. Counsel represented that in 
view of these demands placed upon BCBSU by the plaintiffs and 
the need to research the applicability of the arbitration 
agreement, a motion to compel arbitration was made as soon as a 
good faith basis for doing so existed. (R. 733-734) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court refused to enforce an arbitration 
agreement between the plaintiffs and BCBSU on the ground that 
BCBSU had waived its right to arbitrate the dispute because of 
"active participation" in the litigation prior to moving to 
compel arbitration. In so doing, the court misconstrued the 
law which applies to a claim of waiver of the right to 
arbitrate. The burden upon one who claims waiver is heavy, and 
a waiver occurs only when the party seeking arbitration 
participated substantially in litigation and caused real 
prejudice to the opposing party by doing so. 
In the case at bar, BCBSU moved to compel arbitration 
within five months of answering the plaintiffs1 complaint. The 
action had already been pending against other parties for 
nearly a year before BCBSU was joined. After its joinder, 
BCBSU did nothing of consequence except respond to persistent 
discovery requests from the plaintiffs. As a result, the 
plaintiffs actually benefited from the brief participation of 
BCBSU in the litigation. 
This Court, like most courts, recognizes a strong 
public policy favoring the resolution of disputes through 
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arbitration. The record clearly establishes that BCBSU did not 
waive its right to invoke the arbitration agreement by its 
minimal, passive participation in litigation. The trial 
court's erroneous ruling to the contrary should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT APPLIED AN ERRONEOUS 
STANDARD OF LAW TO THE UNDISPUTED FACTS BY 
FINDING A WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO ARBITRATE 
IN THE ABSENCE OF PREJUDICE TO THE OPPOSING 
PARTY. 
In denying the motion of BCBSU to compel arbitration, 
the district court stated that it was adopting "what appears to 
be the majority position throughout the country," that one who 
is otherwise entitled to arbitration^/ loses that right by 
"actively participating in the litigation process." (R. 709), 
Appendix A. BCBSU respectfully submits that the trial court 
^ In addition to claiming waiver, the plaintiffs below 
resisted arbitration on the ground that their contracts were 
not properly amended to include the arbitration provisions. 
The district court did not reach this issue, and it is not a 
part of this appeal. 
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erred in his adoption of this test for determining waiver of 
the right to arbitration. 
The question posed by this appeal is one of first 
impression for the appellate courts of Utah: what degree of 
participation in litigation by a defendant prior to filing a 
motion to compel arbitration constitutes a waiver of the right 
to arbitrate a dispute which underlies the litigation? The 
federal rule, which is consistent with the views of most state 
courts which have considered the question, should be adopted by 
this Court. A waiver of an otherwise enforceable right to 
arbitrate a dispute occurs only when a defendant has 
substantially participated in litigation to the prejudice of 
the plaintiff before seeking to compel arbitration. 
Although this Court has not been called upon to decide 
the issue, its prior opinions offer guidance as to how it 
should be approached. In Robinson & Wells, P.C. v. Warren, 669 
P.2d 844, 846-847 (Utah 1983), this Court said, 
The policy of our law favors arbitration as 
a speedy and inexpensive method of 
adjudicating disputes. . . . To that end, 
the Legislature amended the Arbitration Act 
to permit valid and enforceable agreements 
for arbitration of future as well as present 
disputes. § 78-31-1. We held that 
amendment constitutional in an opinion that 
reaffirms the strong public policy in favor 
of arbitration . . . This spirit permeates 
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our decisions on judicial review of 
arbitration awards. 
In Lindon City v. Engineers Const. Co., 636 P.2d 1070 
(Utah 1981), this Court quoted with approval the words of the 
Washington Court of Appeals which stated that: 
Arbitration clauses should be liberally 
construed . . . If the scope of an 
arbitration clause is debatable or 
reasonably in doubt, the clause should be 
construed in favor of arbitration unless it 
can be said that it is not susceptible to an 
interpretation that covers the asserted 
dispute. 
636 P.2d at 1073 (quoting King County v. Boeing Co., 18 Wash. 
App. 595, 570 P.2d 713, 717-18 (1977)). 
The United States Congress adopted a federal 
Arbitration Act which is virtually identical in effect to the 
Utah Act, 9 USC § 1, et seq. Recognizing the same public 
policy which this Court has articulated, the United States 
Supreme Court held in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. 
Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) that 
any doubts concerning the scope of 
arbitrable issues should be resolved in 
favor of arbitration, whether the problem at 
hand is the construction of the contract 
language itself or an allegation of waiver, 
delay, or a like defense to arbitrability. 
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(emphasis added). 
Thus, the federal courts have recognized that Mthe 
burden on one seeking to prove a waiver of arbitration is a 
heavy one", Siblev v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 542 (5th Cir. 
1976) and that waiver will be found only "when the party 
seeking arbitration substantially invokes the judicial process 
to the detriment or prejudice of the other party." Price v. 
Drexel Burnhami Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 1156, 1158 (5th Cir. 
1986). In the words of the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, "the litigation of substantial issues going to the 
merits may constitute a waiver of arbitration," but, "waiver of 
the right to compel arbitration due to participation in 
litigation may be found only when prejudice to the other party 
is demonstrated." Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 779 F.2d 885, 887 
(2d Cir. 1985). The facts of that case illustrate the 
application of this standard. 
In Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., an action was brought 
against a broker for securities violations, breach of fiduciary 
duty, fraud and racketeering. The parties had entered into a 
binding arbitration agreement. The defendants' initial 
response was a motion to dismiss, which, after being partially 
granted, resulted in an amended complaint. In its answer to 
the amended complaint, the defendant did not raise 
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arbitrability as a defense. Only several months later was a 
motion made to sever the common law claims and compel 
arbitration. The Second Circuit stated, first, that 
it is beyond question that defendants' delay 
in seeking arbitration during approximately 
eight months of pretrial proceedings is 
insufficient by itself to constitute a 
waiver of the right to arbitrate, for in 
addition, prejudice to Rush must be 
demonstrated. 
Rush v, Oppenheimer & Co., 779 F.2d at 887. The court noted 
that "substantial expense and loss of time by continuing 
litigation instead of demanding arbitration" may justify a 
finding of prejudice, as when a full trial on the merits is 
held before arbitration is demanded. The court also 
distinguished another case, recognizing that putting an 
opposing party to the burden and expense of defending a motion 
for summary judgment and delaying a motion to compel 
arbitration until a few weeks before trial justified a finding 
of waiver in that prior case. The court held that in the case 
before it, however, the filing of an answer without the 
assertion of the defense of arbitration was not prejudicial 
because no important intervening steps were taken by either 
party between the filing of the answer and the filing of the 
motion to compel arbitration. Participation in pretrial 
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discovery was not held to be dispositive of the issue, and the 
court noted that the prejudice required for a waiver of 
arbitration was not the prejudice which was inherent in the 
enforcement of an arbitration agreement, such as the limitation 
on available remedies, or the delay caused by staying other 
proceedings pending arbitration. The Second Circuit reversed 
the trial court's finding of waiver on these grounds and held 
the arbitration agreement to be enforceable. 
The Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co. decision is consistent 
with those of other federal courts which have repeatedly held 
that the failure to assert the defense of arbitrability in an 
answer, the participation by a party in discovery, whether 
through written requests or depositions, and the mere passage 
of time, whether eight months, thirteen months, or three and 
one-half years, do not establish a waiver, in the absence of a 
showing that the opposing party suffered real prejudice. Page 
v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291 
(1st Cir. 1986); J&S Construction Co. v. Travelers Indemnity 
Co., 520 F.2d 809 (1st Cir. 1975); Fisher v. A.G. Becker 
Paribas Inc., 791 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1986); McDonnell Douglas 
Finance v. Pa Power & Light Co., 858 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1988); 
McSwegan v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); 
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Lee v, Grandcor Medical Systems, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 252 (D. 
Colo. 1988). 
There is, admittedly, some variation among state 
courts in standards for determining when a waiver of the right 
to arbitration has occurred under state law. (One court has 
described the applicable body of law as "brutally diverse," 
Bernalillo City Med. Center Emp. v. Cancelosi, 92 N.M. 307, 587 
P.2d 960, 962 (N.M. 1978).) However, the requirement that a 
party opposing the right to arbitration demonstrate prejudice 
from a delay in its assertion is common. 
In County of Clark v. Blanchard Const. Co., 653 P.2d 
1217 (Nev. 1982), the plaintiff appealed from an arbitration 
award on the ground that the defendant had waived its right to 
arbitrate the dispute by answering the plaintiff's complaint 
without asserting the defense, by filing a third party claim 
for indemnity, by responding to interrogatories, and by waiting 
eight months after filing of the complaint before moving to 
compel arbitration. The Nevada Supreme Court expressly 
rejected cases holding that "any participation in litigation," 
such as "answering to the merits of a claim" constitutes waiver 
of the right to arbitrate. Instead, the court held that, 
recognizing its state's "policy strongly favoring arbitration," 
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The central issue in determining waiver of 
the right to arbitrate is not whether the 
moving party's actions have been consistent 
with arbitration, but rather, whether 
prejudice occurred to the party opposing 
arbitration. 
653 P.2d at 1219-1220. In the absence of such a showing, the 
Nevada Supreme Court refused to find a waiver of the right to 
arbitrate. 
The courts of New Mexico have held that a claim of 
waiver must be resolved in the light of three principles: first 
that all doubts as to whether there is a waiver must be 
resolved in favor of arbitration; second, that relief will only 
be granted upon a showing of prejudice, and, third, the extent 
to which the party urging arbitration has previously invoked 
the machinery of the judicial system. Board of Educ. Taos Mun. 
v. The Architects, 103 N.M. 462, 709 P.2d 184 (N.M. 1985). The 
New Mexico Supreme Court has held that mere delay in seeking 
arbitration does not establish prejudice, but that ordinarily 
detrimental reliance by the opposing party through preparation 
for trial must occur. United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic 
Co., 93 N.M. 105, 597 P.2d 290 (N.M. 1979). Furthermore, 
substantial invocation of the judicial machinery is held to 
take place only where the "judicial waters" are tested on some 
-19-
important issue before arbitration is sought. Bernalillo City 
Med. Center Corp. v. Cancelosi, supra. Thus, where the court 
concluded that "nothing of consequence occurred" between the 
plaintiff's filing of a complaint without a demand for 
arbitration, and a later motion to compel arbitration, a waiver 
was not found to have occurred. 
In Keating v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 31 
Cal. 3d 584, 645 P.2d 1192, 1204 rev'd in part, 465 U.S. 1 
(1984), the California Supreme Court observed that there is no 
"single test" for waiver, but reasoned that: 
We have stressed the significance of the 
presence or absence of prejudice. Waiver 
does not occur by mere participation in 
litigation; there must be "judicial 
litigation of the merits or arbitrable 
issues" although "waiver could occur prior 
to a judgment on the merits, if prejudice 
could be demonstrated." 
(Citations omitted.) 
Courts which look to the presence or absence of 
prejudice as determinative of waiver do so on the theory that 
to hold otherwise would be to deprive the strong public policy 
of their jurisdictions favoring arbitration of its effect, 
Carcich v. Rederi A/B Nordie, 389 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1968); 
Keating v. Superior Court, supra. County of Clark v. Blanchard 
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Const. Co.i supra. This Court should adopt the standard for 
determining waiver employed by the federal courts and those 
courts whose opinions are cited here for the same reason: to 
give effect to the strong public policy favoring arbitration 
which this court has already announced. 
Furthermore, since the Utah Arbitration Act was 
"patterned after" the federal act (Comment, Recent Developments 
in Utah Law, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 1,179, n.6, it is natural to 
look to the interpretation given by federal courts of the 
federal act for assistance in construing the Utah Act. More 
importantly, it is now settled law that the federal Arbitration 
Act applies in state courts as well as federal courts. Any 
state law which would render invalid an arbitration agreement 
which is enforceable under the federal act is pre-empted. 
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). BCBSU submits 
that if this Court were to determine that the grounds for 
establishing waiver under Utah law are less stringent than 
those arising under the federal act, federal law should apply 
on account of pre-emption. 
This Court should correct the trial court's error of 
law and hold that substantial participation in litigation which 
prejudices the opposing party must be established before a 
waiver of the right to arbitrate is found. 
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POINT II 
THE RECORD ESTABLISHES THAT THE PLAINTIFFS WERE NOT 
PREJUDICED BY THE MINIMAL, PASSIVE PARTICIPATION OF 
BCBSU IN LITIGATION 
The district court did not find that the plaintiffs 
were prejudiced by the conduct of BCBSU in this litigation. 
Furthermore/ the record contains no evidence upon which a 
finding of prejudice could be made; it is obvious that the 
plaintiffs were not prejudiced. Therefore, the trial court 
erred in finding that BCBSU waived its right to compel 
arbitration. 
In reaching its decision, the district court stated 
that BCBSU "extensively participated in the litigation" and 
that "the involvement in litigation by Blue Cross and Blue 
Shied has been to the extent that arbitration would work a 
substantial prejudice on the remaining parties." (Memorandum 
Decision, R. 709, Appendix A.) 
The extent of BCBSU*s participation in litigation is 
easily discernible from the record. BCBSU was named as a party 
almost a year after the litigation was instituted by the 
plaintiffs. It filed an answer and it cross-claimed against 
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its co-defendants, (parties with whom it has no arbitration 
agreement), for contribution, BCBSU attended depositions 
previously scheduled by the plaintiffs and taken by the 
plaintiffs. It responded to discovery requests propounded by 
the plaintiffs and responded to a deposition notice from the 
plaintiffs by producing a corporate employee for a deposition 
taken by the plaintiffs. 
Although BCBSU submitted discovery requests to the 
plaintiffs after responding to theirs, plaintiffs never 
responded to them. BCBSU only obtained through informal means 
some of the documents which had been provided to other parties 
prior to its joinder. No motion for relief of any kind was 
filed by BCBSU; no hearing was held on any matter, and the 
trial court expressly found that prior to the filing of its 
motion to compel arbitration, the case was not ready for trial. 
It is obvious that from the moment BCBSU was named as 
a defendant, its counsel were consistently pressured to respond 
to demands from the plaintiffs and to accommodate plaintiffs* 
schedule, while at the same time having to "catch up" in a case 
in which considerable discovery had already occurred. Counsel 
for BCBSU explained to the district court that it was not 
immediately clear whether the health care agreements with the 
plaintiffs were amended to contain arbitration provisions, and 
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that the motion was brought when a good faith basis for doing 
so was established. The brief participation by BCBSU in 
litigation was passive, almost wholly responsive to the 
requests of the plaintiffs, and did not affect the status of 
the case. (R 733-734). 
In any event, it is beyond dispute from a review of 
the authorities discussed above, that none of these actions, 
either singly nor in combination, constitutes "substantial 
participation" in litigation which would warrant a finding of 
waiver, in the absence of real prejudice to the plaintiffs. 
County of Clark v. Blanchard Cont. Co., supra; McDonnell 
Douglas Finance v. Pa Power & Light Co., supra. 
Plaintiffs were not put to the burden and expense of 
responding to extensive discovery from the plaintiffs, one form 
of prejudice recognized by the courts, Rush v. Oppenheimer & 
Co., supra; they did not respond to discovery from BCBSU at 
all. Plaintiffs were not required to brief and argue important 
motions, another potentially prejudicial occurrence recognized 
in the foregoing authorities; BCBSU filed no motions at all. 
Plaintiffs did not prepare for trial in reliance upon an 
apparent decision to forgo arbitration; no trial was scheduled 
and the trial court concluded that the case was not ready for 
trial. Nor were the plaintiffs delayed in obtaining a 
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resolution of this dispute by the five months which passed 
between the service of the complaint on BCBSU and the motion to 
compel arbitration; the plaintiffs were busy with discovery 
involving the other four defendants throughout this period of 
time, discovery which presumably would have been necessary even 
if BCBSU had immediately moved to compel arbitration. 
Furthermore, once the motion was filed, the plaintiffs 
responded by denying that the arbitration agreement was 
enforceable, a position they would have advocated with equal 
force had the motions been made five months earlier. 
Plaintiffs have attempted, without avail, to 
characterize the participation by BCBSU in the litigation as 
prejudicial. (See Memorandum of Plaintiffs in Support of 
Motions for Summary Affirmance.) They lament that BCBSU caused 
them "a seven month delay in their race to recover health care 
benefits" (Id., page 8). In fact, only five months passed 
between the filing of an answer by BCBSU and the motion to 
compel arbitration, out of the thirty-one months which have 
elapsed since the action was filed. To describe this period of 
time as "a delay in the recovery of benefits" is nonsensical. 
There is no basis for assuming that plaintiffs will recover 
anything in this action, and, as noted, their response to the 
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motion was not to proceed with arbitration and a resolution of 
their claims but to contest the arbitrability of the dispute. 
Plaintiffs also protest that they have been prejudiced 
Min spending time, energy and money preparing discovery against 
Blue Cross, preparing to try their claims against Blue Cross 
and accommodating Blue Cross to discovery schedules" (Id. 
p. 8). It is impossible to imagine how prejudice can arise 
from obtaining discovery that would be equally useful to the 
plaintiffs in arbitration, and any preparation to try a case in 
which discovery is incomplete and no trial is scheduled, is 
surely preparation that would not be wasted in arbitration. 
It is apparent that plaintiffs have only benefited 
from this brief period of litigation with BCBSU by obtaining a 
deposition, interrogatories and voluminous documents from 
BCBSU. While limited discovery may be available in 
arbitration, plaintiffs were able to take advantage of the full 
range of discovery allowed under the Rules of Civil Procedure, 
with the option of resort to the court if assistance were 
needed. (In fact plaintiffs had no complaint at all about the 
discovery they obtained from BCBSU.) 
The trial court's only reference to prejudice was its 
statement that "arbitration would work a substantial prejudice 
on the remaining parties." (R. 709). This observation misses 
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the mark. Prejudice to co-defendants is not a basis which any 
court has recognized for refusing to enforce an arbitration 
agreement. In multi-defendant or multi-issue litigation where 
not all the claims are arbitrable, arbitration may cause 
inconvenience and delay since claims may have to be severed for 
a separate trial or the action as to other parties may be 
stayed. This is the "prejudice", if it is that, which arises 
from the fact of an arbitration agreement, not the timing of 
its invocation. Only prejudice to the opposing party resulting 
from the movant's participation in the litigation can cause a 
waiver. Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., supra. 
In short, the record is clear that plaintiffs were not 
prejudiced by the minimal extent to which BCBSU participated in 
litigation before moving to compel arbitration. Therefore, the 
trial court erred in finding that BCBSU waived its right to 
arbitrate its dispute with the plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-4 provides, unequivocally, 
that "[t]he court, upon motion of any party showing the 
existence of an arbitration agreement, shall order the parties 
to arbitrate." The mandate of the Federal Act is equally 
plain. The Utah Supreme Court, like the United States Supreme 
Court, has announced a "strong public policy in favor of 
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arbitration" Robinson & Wells, P.C. v. Warren, supra. To 
effectuate this policy, this Court should join the majority of 
other courts which have considered the issue in ruling that a 
waiver of the right to arbitrate will not be lightly inferred, 
but occurs only when substantial participation in litigation 
causes real prejudice to a party opposing arbitration. Under 
this test, it is apparent that the trial court erred in denying 
the motion of BCBSU to compel arbitration. This ruling should 
be reversed. 
DATED this day of August, 1990. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
By. 
David «. Money 
Timothy C. Houpt 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah 
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A P P E N D I X 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
NOV \ k 1989 
SALT LAKE COUNT* 
By. OcputyCto* 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DR. THOMAS E. CHANDLER, 
et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a 
Massachusetts corporation; 
et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-87-7787 
Before the Court is the Motion of the defendant 
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company for Summary 
Judgment, and the Motion of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah 
seeking to compel arbitration and stay proceedings. These 
matters came before the Court for argument. Prior to oral 
argument counsel had extensively briefed their respective 
positions dealing with the aforementioned Motions. At the 
hearing counsel argued their respective positions, and the 
Court took the matter under advisement to further consider the 
legal authorities cited by the parties, and to allow further 
supplementation of legal authorities by counsel. Those 
CHANDLER V. MASS. MUTUAL LIFE PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
supplementations have occurred, the Court has reviewed the 
pre-argument Memoranda submitted by counsel for the parties, 
considered the argument of counsel at the hearing, and has 
reviewed the materials submitted post-hearing. The Court being 
otherwise fully advised, enters the following Memorandum 
Decision-
Turning first to the Motion of the defendant Massachusetts 
Mutual Life Insurance Company for Summary Judgment against the 
plaintiffs. The defendant seeks Summary Judgment on the basis 
that the Utah Dental Association was a "employee organization" 
under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA), and that under ERISA, the plaintiffs' common law tort 
claims are preempted by the federal statute. 
The plaintiffs argue that the Utah Dental Association is 
not a "employee organization," and accordingly the requirements 
of ERISA are not applicable to this suit. It should be noted 
that the plaintiffs are members of the Utah Dental Association, 
but individually employed dental practitioners or retired 
dental practitioners. The Utah Dental Association, at least on 
the face of the pleadings at this point in time, appears to be 
a professional organization to which the plaintiffs voluntarily 
belong. 
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A review of the authorities submitted by the parties in 
this case lead the Court to the conclusion that the Utah Dental 
Association is not an "employee organization," and that the 
circumstances of this case do not fall into the appropriate 
statutory definitions to bring the plaintiffs' claims under the 
federal act. As the plaintiffs' claims in this case are not 
governed by ERISA, the state common law claims are not 
preempted. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court determines that the 
defendant Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company's Motion 
for Summary Judgment must be denied. 
Turning next to the Motion to Compel Arbitration of Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield of Utah, the Court is satisfied that the 
Motion to Compel Arbitration of Blue Cross and Blue Shield is 
out of time. A review of the file shows that Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield have extensively participated in the litigation 
since being joined as a party defendant. This Court adopts 
what appears to be the majority position throughout the country 
with regard to active participation of a defendant with a right 
to arbitrate. That is, a defendant who has a right to 
arbitrate (assuming there is a right to arbitrate in this 
case), loses or otherwise waives that right by actively 
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participating in the litigation process. The Court is 
satisfied that to allow defendant Blue Cross and Blue Shield to 
stay the proceedings, either in part or in whole pending 
arbitration, would be inappropriate and that the involvement in 
litigation by Blue Cross and Blue Shield has been to the extent 
that arbitration would work a substantial prejudice on the 
remaining parties. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court denies Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield's Motion to Compel Arbitration. Having determined 
that the Motion to Compel Arbitration is not well-taken on the 
basis of active participation in the litigation by the movant 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield, the Court declines to address the 
issues raised by the plaintiff as to whether or not there is a 
right to arbitrate on the part of Blue Cross and Blue Shield in 
these proceedings at all. 
Counsel for the plaintiff is to prepare an appropriate 
Order in accordance with this Memorandum Decision, and submit 
the same to the Court pursuant to the Code of Judicial 
Administration. 
Dated this / X day of November, 1989. 
/v 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DR. THOMAS E. CHANDLER; DR. 
MICHAEL E. ALLEN; DR. CLARK 
FULLMER; DR. RODNEY W. 
LIVINGSTON; DR. GARTH L. 
NELSON; DR. GENE M. RICHARDS; 
DR. PHILLIP H. SPENCER; 
DR. CLIVE C. INGRAM; 
DR. DAVID B. HINCKS; 
DR. ALDEAN WASHBURN; and DR. PAUL 
R. OLSEN; individually and on 
behalf Of MEMBERS OF THE UTAH 
DENTAL ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Massachusetts 
corporation; GARY D. 
HENDERSON; STEVEN G. SHOLY; the 
UTAH DENTAL ASSOCIATION, a Utah 
incorporated association; and 
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF 
UTAH, a Utah corporation. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT 
BLUE CROSS & BLUE SHIELD 
OF UTAH'S MOTION TO 
COMPEL ARBITRATION AND 
TO STAY PROCEEDINGS 
Civil No. 87-07787 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
Defendants. 
Defendant Blue Cross & Blue Shield's Motion to Compel 
Arbitration and to Stay Proceedings came on for hearing on August 
28, 1989, at 2:00 P.M. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah was rep-
resented by David R. Money and Timothy C. Houpt. Norman J. 
Younker and Michael L. Chidester appeared on behalf of plain-
tiffs. Also present were Heinz Mahler on behalf of defendants 
Gary D. Henderson and Steven G. Sholy and Karra Porter on behalf 
of defendant Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company. Upon 
consideration of the moving papers, the written memoranda, exhib 
its and oral arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing 
therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that 
defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Proceedings 
is denied. The Court finds that Blue Cross & Blue Shield has 
participated in the litigation since being joined as a party 
defendanJL to such an extent that any right to arbitration has 
been waived and that arbitration would work a substantial preju-
dice on the remaining parties. 
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DATED this,-y/ day of^NovBmbe^ 1989 
"imothy R. Hanson 
'District Court Judge 
Dav: 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah 
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